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Abstract—Real-Time Ethernet has become the major commu-
nication technology for modern automation and industrial control
systems. On the one hand, this trend increases the need for an
automation-friendly security solution, as such networks can no
longer be considered sufficiently isolated. On the other hand,
it shows that, despite diverging requirements, the domain of
Operational Technology (OT) can derive advantage from high-
volume technology of the Information Technology (IT) domain.
Based on these two sides of the same coin, we study the challenges
and prospects of approaches to communication security in real-
time Ethernet automation systems. In order to capitalize the
expertise aggregated in decades of research and development,
we put a special focus on the reuse of well-established security
technology from the IT domain. We argue that enhancing such
technology to become automation-friendly is likely to result in
more robust and secure designs than greenfield designs. Because
of its widespread deployment and the (to this date) nonexistence
of a consistent securiy architecture, we use PROFINET as a
showcase of our considerations. Security requirements for this
technology are defined and different well-known solutions are
examined according their suitability for PROFINET. Based on
these findings, we elaborate the necessary adaptions for the
deployment on PROFINET.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a local area network (LAN) technology, Ethernet has
become very successful and widely adopted [1]. It became the
standard network technology for Information Technology (IT)
installations in computing centers, office buildings, and private
households. The high rate of adoption came with a drop in
cost for the hardware, which ultimately motivated the adoption
of Ethernet in other, non-IT domains. The field of industrial
automation is only one such example where Ethernet and
Ethernet-based real-time protocols has conquered the shop-
floor level.
In addition to improved cost efficiency the reuse of a
well-established technology like Ethernet can bring about a
number of both assets and drawbacks. While it helps enable
the increasingly desired seamless vertical integration from the
business level down to the field level, it also significantly
lowers the bar for malicious actors inside the network. It
should therefore be understandable that solutions to protect
modern automation components from attacks over not any
longer isolated communication networks are required.
That said, relying on mature technology also helps avoiding
the probability of repeating past technological mistakes; an
attitude universally accepted in the security community. We
consider this a strong argument for a systematic analysis of
the suitability of existing and proven security technology from
the IT domain for its deployment in automation systems.
However, industrial automation systems feature require-
ments that clearly deviate from those of classical IT sys-
tems [2]. The most important differences are hard (real-)time
requirements, multi-decade device lifecycles, uninterrupted
operation, and minimal human maintenance. In other words,
just as was the case with Ethernet itself, domain-specific
adaptions are likely to be necessary.
In fact, various automation field busses such as Ether-
net/IP [3] and OPC UA TSN [4] have considered or even
adopted security technology from the IT world. As part of the
German research project ”Sichere Produktion mit verteilten
Automatisierungssystemen (SEC PRO )”, the performance of
security mechanisms as encryption and message authentication
in real-time communication was evaluated [5], [6] as well as
concepts for platform integrity, key distribution and a public
key infrastructure were proposed [7], [8]. As in the SEC PRO
study, PROFINET serves as representative technology in the
field of real-time automation systems for our work, although
the findings are valid for general real-time Ethernet based field
bus technologies.
In Section II we provide an overview of PROFINET as
our case study automation system. Section III outlines the
requirements and challenges one typically faces when indus-
trial automation systems must be secured. As the main part
of our paper, in Section IV we systematically explore the
design space of communication security solutions for real-time
Ethernet automation systems. Section V presents a case study
applied to PROFINET. In Section VI, an analysis of security
considerations made for other technologies in the automation
systems market follows. Finally, Section VII summarizes our
paper and concludes.
II. PROFINET OVERVIEW
PROFINET (Process Field Network) is an Industrial Eth-
ernet standard for automation systems, originating from the
PROFIBUS fieldbus technology and standardised by the
PROFIBUS Nutzerorganistion e.V. (PNO) in Karlsruhe, Ger-
many. PROFINET makes use of TCP/IP Communication and
other common IT standards, mainly for the configuration and
commissioning of industrial control systems and includes a
multi-class real-time communication concept. The integration
of decentralized peripherals into an industrial control system
is realized by PROFINET IO (Input - Output). PROFINET
IO defines the communication concept between components
within such a system [9] [10].
A. Architecture
PROFINET IO defines three different device classes within
their networks [9, p. 34]:
• IO-Supervisor: The Engineering Station (ES), usually
a PC or HMI (Human Machine Interface) device for
parametrization, commissioning and monitoring.
• IO-Controller: A Programmable Logic Controller
(PLC), containing and executing the automation appli-
cation programmed from the IO-Supervisor.
• IO-Device: A decentralized Input-Output device acting
as the slave within an PROFINET IO Network. An IO-
Device can either be a sensor or an actuator.
Typically, a PROFINET IO industrial control system con-
tains of one IO-Supervisor, which is usually only temporarily
connected, one IO-Controller and several IO-Devices.
B. Relations
The communication between an IO-Controller (or IO-
Supervisor) and an IO-Device is organized in virtual channels,
so-called Application Relations (AR). An AR is setup after
the first connection request, followed by the exchange of
communication parameters and device information [10, pp.
78-80]. One AR consists of multiple Communication Relations
(CR), a Record Data CR for acyclic standard communication
(referred by non-real-time CR in figure 1), an IO Data CR for
the transmission of the Input-Output data and an Alarm CR for
the acyclic alarm data (both referred by real-time CR in figure
1) [9, p. 42]. Application relations between IO-Supervisor and
IO-Device (figure 1, right) can be setup for monitoring or
changing device parameters.
C. Protocols
Table I lists the protocols used in PROFINET IO, divided
into real-time and non-real-time communication and assigned
to the corresponding ISO/OSI layer. The PROFINET IO
Services, i.e. the PROFINET stack resides in the application
Fig. 1. PROFINET IO system architecture: Example Network consisting of
an IO-Supervisor, an IO-Controller and two IO-Devices with corresponding
Communication Relations (CR) and Application Relations (AR).
layer. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC, layer 7b in table I) is
the first non-real-time protocol, it allows execution of functions
in a different address space (e.g. another device). Layer 3
and 4 hold the common standard IT protocols User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), used
for non time critical data transmission as e.g. commissioning,
and the Internet Protocol (IP), Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) as well as the Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP)[10, pp. 40-43]. The Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP, layer 3 in table I) is used for collecting con-
figuration information about managed devices in IP networks
[10, p. 139-140]. The real-time-class protocols 1 to 3 (and
the additional non-real-time protocol over UDP) to transmit
IO-Data are defined as follows [10, pp. 48-49]:
• Real-Time-Class UDP (RT CLASS UDP): Non-Real-
Time (NRT) IO data traffic over UDP. Typical cycle-times
of 100ms.
• Real-Time-Class 1 (RTC1): Real-Time (RT) cyclic data
transmission without any special requirements on switch
hardware. No routing. Cycle-times between 5− 10ms.
• Real-Time-Class 2 (RTC2): Isochronous Real-Time (IRT)
transmission of cyclic data. Special switch hardware
required. No topology planning. Cycle-times < 1ms.
• Real-Time-Class 3 (RTC3): High-performance transmis-
sion. Suitable for motion-control applications. Special
switches and prior (topology-based) communication plan-
ning required. Cycle times down to 31.25µs.
In PROFINET IO systems, all process events (alarms) are
reported using the Real-Time Acyclic (RTA) protocol [10, p.
84]. Prerequisite for time-synchronous real-time communica-
tion are synchronized clocks. This is achieved through the
application of the Precision Time Control Protocol (PTCP),
which is based on the IEEE 1588 standard Precision Time
Protocol (PTP) [10, pp. 56-58]. The non-real-time protocols
OSI Layer Real-Time (RT) Non-Real-Time (NRT)
7a PROFINET IO Services
7b Application RPC
6 Presentation
5 Session
4 Transport UDP / TCP
IP / ARP / ICMP /
3 Network ICMP / SNMP
RTC1-3 / RTA / RT CLASS UDP /
2 Data Link PTCP / DCP LLDP / MRP
1 Physical 100BASE-TX / 100BASE-FX
TABLE I
PROFINET IO PROTOCOLS.
on the data link layer are the Link Layer Discovery Pro-
tocol (IEEE 802.1AB LLDP), used for topology monitoring
and neighborhood detection, the Media Redundancy Protocol
(MRP) for redundancy in ring topology networks and the
Discovery and basic Configuration Protocol (DCP). The latter
is used to configure the IP addresses and device names of
PROFINET IO-Devices [10, pp. 86-87]. DCP also offers a
service to reset PROFINET devices to a factory default state.
Some of the DCP services rely on multicast communication.
The physical layer relies on 100 Mbit/s Ethernet over twisted-
pair cable (100BASE-TX) or optical fibre (100BASE-FX)
alternatively (layer 1 in table I).
D. Security Issues
The introduction of Ethernet-based fieldbus protocols in
automation control systems has increased performance and
efficiency but also led to the appearance of security risks.
PROFINET IO is one of the prevalent fieldbus protocols
used in industrial control systems based on Ethernet. Such
PROFINET IO based networks can be accesible from a
companies office network or - under special circumstances -
even the world wide web. Besides all advantages that come
with this opportunity, this also opens the opportunity for
well-known attacks from the IT domain carried out on the
field level. In contrast to the office network environment,
security weaknesses can be considered to be more severe, since
system down times, e.g. caused by denial-of-service attacks,
can generate enormous financial and physical damages [10,
p. 419]. For this reason and the fact that automation systems
can transmit potentially critical or confidential data, a solution
to consolidate security in such systems is needed. Security
requirements such as authentication, confidentiality through
encryption, integrity and availability have to be considered just
as well as the limited resources of already installed modules
and equipment. To define such specific security related re-
quirements and provide suitable countermeasures, the possible
attacks on the different PROFINET IO protocols, i.e. the OSI
layers need to be precisely identified.
III. REQUIREMENTS AND CHALLENGES
The requirements on automation systems differ significantly
compared to the general IT office environment. Downtimes
directly lead to production rejects. The potential resulting fi-
nancial damage needs to be prevented under all circumstances.
These specific requirements are discussed within this chapter.
A. Automation System Requirements
Based on the PROFINET Security Guideline[11], we list the
requirements that must be fulfilled after establishing a security
concept in the PROFINET and general (real-time) industrial
control system environments:
• Availability
• Real-time capability
• Straightforward and cost-efficient commissioning and de-
vice replacement
• Long-term operation without human attendance
• Coexistence and interoperability (security-aware and
legacy devices)
Availability must remain unimpaired after security mecha-
nisms are implemented and even if an impact on the perfor-
mance can not be prevented completely, real-time requirements
(i.e. strict cycle times) must be met. The integration (i.e.
commissioning and replacement) includes the configuration of
the appropriate security measures. Minimizing this configura-
tion effort increases the acceptance of the proposed solutions,
especially as most automation and maintenance technicians
do not have a deep understanding of security. Components
of an automation system are designed to operate over long
periods, usually without ever being shut down or manually
reconfigured. A fitting security solution must adhere to this
mode of operation. Thus possible manual actions needed to
preserve the required level of security, such as key renewal,
shall not interfere with operations. Also due to long-term
operation, it can not be assumed that all legacy devices will
be replaced with security-aware devices as soon as they are
available. Therefore, it must be possible to integrate devices
including security mechanisms seamlessly into existing au-
tomation systems and operate them in parallel with legacy
devices without limitations other than missing security.
B. Security Objectives
Following objectives shall be addressed within a security
solution for real-time Ethernet based automation systems:
• Device authentication: Network components (controller,
device, engineering station) mutually authenticate them-
selves to their communication partners, where the claimed
identity must be verified.
• Authorization: Ensure, that an (authenticated) communi-
cation partner is allowed to perform the intended opera-
tion.
• Message authentication: The receiver of a message must
be able to verify its integrity (i.e. detect tampering) and if
it originates from a known sender. Furthermore, message
authentication must prevent the possibility of replayed
messages.
• Message confidentiality: The content of a message shall
be hidden from possible eavesdroppers that are able to
intercept them.
Automation systems may transmit confidential data, i.e.
perhaps their disclosure could reveal trade secrets. Neverthe-
less, encryption to protect systems from this threat causes
a significant performance overhead. For this reason, security
mechanisms that provide confidentiality should be optionally
configurable. In addition to the mentioned security objectives,
access to an automation network from the companies’ IT
infrastructure or the internet should be avoided after commis-
sioning (except during monitoring). Also, physical access to
the system should only be allowed to authorized personnel.
Such physical security measures are not discussed further
within this document, as the focus is on protocol security.
IV. EXPLORING THE DESIGN SPACE
In this section, we are going to explore the landscape of
potential security solutions for PROFINET along three more or
less orthogonal dimensions. These are related to the following
questions:
1) Which OSI layer(s) is/are most suitable for hosting
PROFINET security?
2) Which cryptographic building blocks can be (re)used to
provide PROFINET security?
3) Which identities drive entity (e.g., device, controller)
authentication and how are corresponding cryptographic
keys managed?
A. Stack and Protocol Integration
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) computer network
architecture not only delivers a common base for designing
and implementing networking solutions, it also serves as a
foundation for decisions where (i.e. at which layer) to place
security services that satisfy the defined requirements. The ITU
Telecommunication Standardization Sector has setup a security
architecture recommendation (ITU-T X.800 [12], identical
to ISO/IEC standard 7498-2:1989 [13]) on the position of
specific security services within the OSI reference model.
This architecture provides a useful overview of many modern
network security concepts [14, p. 27] and will therefore be
elaborated precisely respecting the defined requirements for
PROFINET.
1) Principles on Layer Integration: First, we define some
principles that should be used to determine the allocation of
security objectives to layers within the OSI model (compare
to section 6.1.1 in [12]):
(a) The number of alternative ways to achieve a security ob-
jective should be minimized. Particularly, this should be
kept in mind respecting interoperability between devices
of different vendors.
(b) Spreading implementations for security services over
multiple layers is feasible, but
(c) Violation of layer independence should be avoided, i.e.
do not provide any functionality within one layer which is
technically covered by a different (upper or lower) layer.
(d) Wherever security mechanisms are dependent on other
(security) mechanisms on a different layer, (possible)
intermediate layers need to be designed in such way
OSI Layer Security Service
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- - X X - - X* Device Authentication
- - X X - - X* Integrity (Message Authentication)
X** X X X - - X* Confidentiality
X Implementation of security functionality in this layer feasible.
- Implementation of security functionality in this layer not recommended.
* Implementation exclusively in layer 7 feasible, but only support of lower
layer functionality is recommended.
** Physical layer functionality for confidentiality (e.g. spread-spectrum
technology) unfeasible in PROFINET context.
TABLE II
PLACEMENT OF SECURITY SERVICES FOR PROFINET WITHIN THE OSI
MODEL.
that security violation is impracticable (i.e. avoid covert
channels).
(e) Where possible, security functionalities added to a spe-
cific layer should be designed as self-contained modules.
This means, apart from the integration of such modules,
the implementation of the original layer functionality
remains unchanged.
2) Placement of Security within OSI model: Table II defines
the possible placement of security services within the OSI
model. This is a simplified subset, adapted to the requirements
for PROFINET security, from the placement recommended by
ITU-T (section 7.8 in [12]). All key security requirements
defined for PROFINET can be met either on the network,
transport or application layer or combinations of them. Con-
fidentiality could also be achieved by solutions located in the
data link or physical layer. Within the PROFINET context,
confidentiality services within the physical layer are unfeasi-
ble, since this would require changes of the Ethernet standard.
Implementation of security services exclusively within the
application layer, i.e. the PROFINET stack, would need to
be developed proprietary from each PROFINET stack vendor
and even adjusted to the system-specific needs of the device
vendors applying these software stacks. Also, to apply security
services in the application layer, actual frame content, i.e.
payload, needs to be assembled therein, what is not necessarily
the case. Supporting lower layer security functionality from the
application layer is recommended. This means for example,
instead of directly passing application data to a lower layer,
calling standardized interfaces of security mechanisms residing
in an intermediary layer.
3) Recommendation for PROFINET Security: Simplifying
the adoption of a security concept for PROFINET is significant
for success. The effort for stack and device vendors to integrate
security measures into their devices (new and legacy) should
be kept as low as possible. Also, even more important, this pro-
cess should not differ between the multiple adopters, to keep
the number of alternative solutions minimal (and thus also
the possible error sources). While stack implementations vary
widely, networking functionality in lower layers (mainly) do
not. Working closer to the hardware also brings the advantage
of a more seamless integration of hardware acceleration for
cryptographic algorithms, which can be crucial to meet strict
timing requirements. Therefore, we recommend the integration
of security functionality into the network or transport layer.
B. Cryptographic Building Blocks
When devising security solutions for industrial communi-
cation systems, one often finds two major design objectives
being in manifest conflict. On the one hand, security solutions
shall build on well-established standards that minimize the
potential to fail with a solution designed from scratch. On
the other hand, almost all such standards were developed
in the context of office and Internet IT; domains, whose
operational requirements are hardly comparable to those of
industrial automation systems. Tight timing constraints in the
latter systems may, for instance, easily render any standard
solution effectively or apparently inapplicable.
That said, preconceptions regarding the appropriateness
of IT standard solutions for industrial automation systems
sometimes seem to bias the discussion about a suitable
security solution towards custom reinventions. We believe
that premature disqualification of IT technology for industrial
automation systems is at least questionable. At second glance,
the assumptions and requirements imposed by IT standards
may turn out to be less rigid than initially assumed.
Moreover is it worth noting that custom re-designs rarely
follow entirely new paths, but rather are guided by existing so-
lutions. This tendency would be without problems if the design
delta held more potential to feature significant benefits than to
introduce security-critical design flaws. The field of security
engineering has gone through an extensive learning process
with numerous painful but invaluable lessons. Any decision
for building custom solutions should therefore be based on
very strong arguments against using standard solutions.
If the development of a custom solution should turn out as
the only viable approach, it has to be ensured that the concept
as well as the implementation will be carefully revised by
experts. This implies the need for disclosure of all documents,
algorithms and generally the source code of the designed so-
lution. Following Kerckhoffs’s principle [15, p. 226], security
of a cryptographic system shall never rely on non-disclosure
of its technical details.
1) Fundamental Conceptual Elements: At its minimum,
protecting PROFINET communication from unauthorized
spoofing and tampering requires a cryptographic checksum
calculated over relevant data and added to corresponding
messages. Note that the checksum’s precise implementation
(i.e., the localization of its application within the PROFINET
stack or the cryptographic algorithm it is based on) is beside
the point of the current consideration. Furthermore, observe
that encryption (as a means against unauthorized disclosure of
data) is an optional feature, which is straightforward to add if
cryptographic integrity protection is already in place.
In all practical scenarios, means for supplying authenti-
cated and renewable cryptographic keys to the data protection
algorithms are required. A corresponding authenticated key
exchange between communicating entities should rely on
cryptographic long-term credentials whose possession is the
technical embodiment of entity legitimization.
The decision between standard and custom solutions is to
be answered on at least two levels. The first level is related to
the choice of cryptographic algorithm(s). Given the intricate
nature of cryptographic algorithm design and the availability
of a wide range of proven algorithms, most likely one resorts
to existing cryptographic algorithms.
On the second level, however, the answer might be less
clear. Here, the question to answer is whether the selected
cryptographic algorithms need to be embedded in a custom
protocol, or whether one can make use of standard protocols.
As an example, consider the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
In the following, we are going to provide a systematic
analysis of existing standard solutions with respect to their
applicability for PROFINET communuication security. We
show that standard solutions are not necessarily less efficient
than a sound and secure custom solution would be.
C. Identity Management
For communication relying on symmetric cryptography,
namely message authentication and symmetric encryption, the
two (or more) parties intending to communicate with each
other must share the same secret key. Such a key can either
be a session key (i.e. valid for a fixed duration or until a
connection is closed) or a permanent key. In both cases, access
to key material by unauthorized third parties needs to be
prevented. Standard IT networks often apply a public key
infrastructure (PKI), consisting of certificates (i.e. X.509v3)
issued by certificate authorities (CA). Such certificates contain
a public key of an entity and are distributed to possible
communication partners, which can use this public key to
encrypt the traffic for the establishment of a shared secret
key. Before starting such an establishment, the validity of a
received certificate can by checked by verifying the signatures
of the issuer and tracing back through the hierarchy up to the
root CA - categorised as trustworthy[14, pp. 131-141]. Such
a trace back requires online interaction with the root CA,
what is not indeed practicable in usually physical separated
automation system networks. In this environment, following
design decisions for identity management solutions may be
considered:
• Key authority: Who assigns (public or symmetric) keys
to a device?
• Key establishment: How is the acutal symmetric key to
protect the traffic established?
• Key sharing: Which devices share the same secret (pair-
wise vs. site- or system-wide)?
• Key storage: How is key material stored within a device
to prevent malicious access?
In the automation system environment, all network partici-
pants are usually known, i.e. number of devices and their tasks
remain the same. Even if a device will be replaced, it inherits
the functionality of its predecessor. Therefore, the application
of certificates is not benefitial and could be substituted by
raw public keys assigned statically to devices (including the
corresponding private keys). Possible authorities to assign a
key could be the device vendors at production or the site
manager before commissioning. A solution to this - also to
the other questions - is highly dependent on a consensus of
all involved parties (device vendors, provider of needed config-
uration tools and site managers i.e. customers). Therefore, no
specific proposal has been elaborated within this publication.
V. CASE STUDY: COMMUNICATION SECURITY FOR
PROFINET
In this section we examine standard communication security
mechanisms according their suitability for PROFINET and
work out which adaptions are needed to fulfill the requirements
mentioned in section III.
A. Standard Network Security Mechanisms
Standard IT security solutions were not designed explicitly
for the usage in industrial control system environments. There-
fore, advantages and drawbacks of existing well established
solutions applied to PROFINET need to be discussed.
1) Network Access Control (NAC): IEEE 802.1X is a stan-
dard for port based network access control (NAC). Basically it
defines an extension of the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) for the usage within the network layer, named EAPOL
(EAP over LAN). A device aiming to get access to a local area
network sends an EAPOL request packet to an authentication
server (AS) including the credentials. The port of this device
remains isolated from the network as long as the authentication
request was not confirmed by the AS[14, pp. 161-163]. A
modification of the EAPOL protocol - defined in the 802.1AE
standard for MAC security (MACSec) - ensures confidentiality
through point-to-point encryption of the traffic[16]. This com-
bination seems to provide a valid solution for PROFINET at
first glance. In fact, the EAPOL protocol makes use of an own
Ethertype and the 802.1AE standard defines additional fields
to the standard Ethernet packet what violates the requirement
of interoperability with legacy devices. Also, the need of
an authentication server within a PROFINET network is not
advisable given the challenge to develop a cost-efficient solu-
tions. Finally, the defined cipher-suite AES-GCM1 is around
3 to 4 times slower than other (hash- or block cipher based)
message authentication methods[6].
2) Internet Protocol Security (IPSec): IPSec is a protocol
suite for authentication and encryption of traffic sent over
a local area network (LAN) standardised by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF)[17]. It consists of two proto-
cols, Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP), whereby the usage of AH is deprecated
since it only provides integrity while ESP provides both
integrity and confidentiality[14, p.286]. ESP even supports
an authentication-only configuration (see NULL encryption
algorithm defined in RFC2410[18]). IPSec can operate in two
different modes, the transport mode or tunnel mode. In the
transport mode, the original IP header is preserved while in
1Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois Counter Mode: A block cipher
mode for authenticated encryption, providing integrity and confidentiality [6].
tunnel mode, the added security fields and the header are
protected and a new (outer) header is added to the frame. In the
latter configuration, the end-points can be addressed directly
within the outer IP header and no intermediates (thus also
eavesdroppers) are able to examine the original inner header.
Establishment and management of key material is realized by
the application of the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2,
see [14, pp. 305-313]). While IPSec operates on the network
layer (layer 3, table I), PROFINET real-time packets are
directly built on the data link layer below. These would require
major changes on the IPSec implementation to secure real-time
traffic, what is not advisable due to its high complexity. Also,
the flexibility to use cipher suites other than standardised is
not explicitly addressed.
3) (Datagram) Transport Layer Security ((D)TLS): As its
name suggests, Transport Layer Security (TLS) builds upon
the transport layer (layer 4, table I) and allows establish-
ing a protected channel between two communication end
points. As TLS relies on a reliable transport protocol (i.e.
TCP with implicit packet reordering)[19], an adaption for
datagram based protocols (DTLS) was designed, where re-
liability is provided explicitly[20]. During the initial (D)TLS
handshake, the communication partners - i.e. server and client
- authenticate each other, establish the cryptographic keys
and negotiate the message authentication and (optional) en-
cryption algorithms collected in so-called cipher suites (e.g.
TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256, asymmetric en-
cryption of key exchange using RSA2, symmetric encryp-
tion of application data using 128-Bit AES-CBC3, SHA-2564
hash-based message authentication code). After a successful
handshake, application data from upper layers are captured
by the record protocol, where the negotiated cryptographic
algorithms are applied before the frames are passed on to
the underlying transport protocol[14, pp. 185-189]. Even if
technically designed for the use over TCP or UDP respectively,
both TLS and DTLS may be used over any transport protocol
(though some adjustments to meet its requirements may be
needed, as e.g. padding to minimal frame length). For reasons
of limited resources or performance, it may be considered to
add own cipher suites and even define them as mandatory
within the PROFINET context. We therefore rate (D)TLS as
a flexible and suitable base for the development of a security
solution for PROFINET.
B. (D)TLS for PROFINET
Besides the already mentioned prospects of reusing standard
IT security solutions over a custom re-design in section IV-B,
using the well-established (D)TLS protocol as candidate for
2RSA algorithm: A public key encryption algorithm named after its
inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman [14, pp. 98-100].
3Advanced Encryption Standard in Cipher Block Chaining mode: Each
plaintext block is combined with its previous ciphertext block (XOR) before
the acutal encryption is executed [6].
4Secure Hash Algorithm 2: A cryptographically secure one way compres-
sion function producing fixed length output (in this case of 256 bits) [14, pp.
84-88]
Type Version Epoch Sequence Number Length
Major Minor
(1 Byte) (1 Byte) (1 Byte) (2 Bytes) (6 Bytes) (2 Bytes)
Payload
(plaintext or encrypted)
Message Authentication Code
(MAC)
TABLE III
DTLS RECORD FORMAT [20].
adaption to PROFINET brings several advantages (compare
to [21]):
• No need to define a new cryptographic negotiation, au-
thentication, and key exchange protocol between commu-
nicating devices
• No need to train software developers on how to use new
cryptographic protocols or libraries
• Automatically benefit from new cipher suites by simply
upgrading to the standard TLS software stack
• Automatically benefit from new features, bugfixes (mea-
sures against emerged security weaknesses), etc. in TLS
software stack upgrades
The concept of protected communication channels between
end-points can be directly mapped to the natural device-pairing
approach of PROFINET, i.e. the Application Relations (AR)
and Communication Relations (CR) (see section II-B). Never-
theless, there are some challenges to be met in the PROFINET
context that may require adjustments on the existing (D)TLS
standard:
a) Performance: To meet strict real-time requirements,
not only the execution times of the cryptographic algorithms
defined within the cipher suite need to analyzed, also the
impact on the actual transmission times by the frame overhead
(due to additional security specific protocol fields) deserves
more careful consideration. Generally, all transmission of use-
less or redundant information shall be prevented. With DTLS,
application data are transmitted within so called records,
including header fields for the type of subprotocol (handshake,
alert, change cipher spec and record), the protocol version
number (e.g. DTLS 1.2), epoch (counter on cipher state
changes), a sequence number and the frame length (see table
III). While the protocol version could be omitted for the
use in PROFINET it also may be thought of validating the
frame length implicitly. The lenght of required fields (number
of bytes) also needs to be examined and shortened where
possible.
b) Channel Multiplexing: The default transport protocols
for (D)TLS, UDP and TCP, make use of ports, associated
with an IP address, which allows them to manage multiple
independent channels. The tupels of port numbers and trans-
port addresses serve as identifiers used by (D)TLS to select
the correct connection state (and therefore know how long a
session key is still valid). Since Ethernet does not make use
of something similar to ports, this feature is missing. Without
adaption of the standard, key renewal (i.e. performing a new
handshake), blocks the actual channel. This could result in
a negative impact on the real-time behavior. To prevent this,
an additional field to differentiate between multiple channels
needs to be introduced - named e.g. channel ID. Properly
implemented, the channel multiplexing can preserve real-time
capability and ensures a new key is available when it is needed.
c) Broadcast/Multicast: Some protocols in PROFINET
rely in broad- or multicast communication (e.g. DCP). Ob-
viously, protecting this communication does not fit within
an end-to-end device pairing. These protocols need to be
examined precisely whether their protection is mandatory or
this requirement can be waived. It could be considered to
only protect security critical messages (for DCP this could be
e.g. factory reset or name assignment), which are designed as
unicast services. Protecting multicast services too could only
be realized by sending the messages to all intended devices
separately (using the particular negotiated cipher suite and
keys). Evaluation of this possibility in regard to interoperabil-
ity with legacy devices can not yet be reliably concluded.
d) Preserving of FrameID: The PROFINET real-time
protocols (see data link layer in table I) makes use of a
frame identifier to be distinguished from each other. In systems
with very low cycle times (specially isochronous real-time
capable systems), devices may be used that filters incoming
frames according to this identifier in hardware before passing
them on to the application. To retain the interoperability
with such devices, the PROFINET FrameID shall be placed
outside of the (D)TLS record and, in particular, prevented from
encryption. This requires some adaption to standard (D)TLS
since the frame identifier is provided to the record protocol
within the application data.
e) Binding to Application: Even if the key functionality
(the record protocol) of (D)TLS is located within the transport
layer, the change cipher spec, handshake and alert protocols
are located above the transport layer and may be integrated
in to the stack. This seems to be no big challenge since they
function independently of the application. Nevertheless, it may
be useful to provide interfaces to the actual PROFINET stack,
e.g. to respond to specific alarms. Also, the initial connection
establishment needs to be started through the application. Such
interfaces needs to be designed as lean as possible to minimize
the effort of integration in different stack architectures.
f) Constrained Components: General PROFINET de-
vices (in particular IO Devices) are designed as embedded
systems and typically resource constraints (low memory ca-
pacity and processing power). This leads to the possibility that
a fully featured (D)TLS implementation can not be ported to
such devices. To minimize the memory footprint of a (D)TLS
adoption for PROFINET, only the necessary functionality must
be included, while other shall be omitted (e.g. certificate parser
and deprecated cipher suites).
g) Different (D)TLS Instances: Non-real-time traffic as
e.g. RPC (over UDP) do not require any performance opti-
mization or other adaptions to (D)TLS. Since they are not
time critical, it can be considered to protect them with an
even stronger (and therefore more time-consuming) cipher
suite than the real-time traffic. Besides that, interfaces to the
application layer could differ for real-time and non-real time
protocols, since their paths throught the PROFINET stack vary.
Therefore, an approach consisting of two separate instances
of (D)TLS, one optimized for performance and usage over
Ethernet, the other optimized for communication security of
non-real-time traffic (over UDP), could be considered. Using
such a setup expects a detailed evaluation whether secrets or
connection states shall be shared between these instances or if
they need to be treated as completely independent channels.
h) Time Synchronization: In standard (D)TLS, the usual
entity authentication is based on certificates, which need to be
validated. Since this validation needs a correctly synchronized
time to be able to check the expiration date, PROFINET
devices adopting this authentication method would require
time synchronization. If the defined identity management (see
chapter IV-C) solution makes use of this functionality, timing
synchronization would become mandatory for security-enabled
PROFINET devices. As mentioned, this topic is not addressed
further within this publication. Despite this, we recommend to
omit any public key schemes depending on synchronized time
on devices.
i) Unattended Operation: (D)TLS was originally de-
signed to be operated by human users (in the internet), conse-
quently in case of failure (e.g. invalid certificate, connection
error or similar), the user can decide what action he wants to
take (e.g. ignore or request support). In PROFINET there is
no such human interaction. For this reason, it is mandatory to
identify each possible operation and failure state and define
which specific action has to be performed in this case.
j) Client/Server Scale Inversion: A (D)TLS handshake
for connection establishment is initiated by the (D)TLS client
(with a client hello message). In a PROFINET system, the
initiator of a connection is the IO Controller. Applying this to
(D)TLS for PROFINET results in one (or at least only few)
clients and many servers. This setup maybe unusual, but in
fact will have no impact on the scalability or functionality.
k) Rare Interaction with ES: Typically, an automation
system is - once programmed and configured - no longer
connected to on-site components that are not needed for
operation, as e.g. the Engineering Station (ES). As long as the
ES is not needed as certificate authority (CA) to verify other
components authenticity, such an interaction is not required in
any case.
VI. ANALYZING THE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS MARKET
Security for automation systems experienced a boost in re-
cent times. A shared understanding has emerged, that network
segmentation for physical separation (so-called demilitarized
zones DMZ) are not sufficient to mitigate all attack vectors.
Another widespread industrial protocol besides PROFINET is
Ethernet/IP, an open standard managed by ODVA5. In their
security approach, integrity and confidentiality is addressed
5Open DeviceNet Vendors Association, Inc.: A global standard development
organization consisting of suppliers of devices for industrial automation
applications.
with the use of TLS and (D)TLS respectively while end-
point authentication can be realized with either pre-shared
keys (PSK) or certificates (X.509v3)[3]. OPC UA6 TSN (Time
Sensitive Networking) is a promising, vendor independent
successor technology of Ethernet-based fieldbus systems. TSN
covers a variety of standards for real-time communication,
time synchronization, scheduling and traffic prioritization as
well as high bandwidth efficiency, while OPC UA is targeting
embedded devices and comes with a security concept also
relying on TLS and X.509 certificates [4]. Besides industrial
process control, other fields of application as e.g. building
automation has to deal with the integration of security critical
services. BACnet7 and KNXnet8 are communication protocols
also (though not exclusively) built on Ethernet for building
automation systems. The security mechanisms IPSec, TLS
and VPN (virtual private network) were rated respecting their
suitability for the use with BACnet and KNXnet. While IPSec
requires significant changes to allow the establishment of
shared secrets between more than two parties, it is labelled as
unsuitable for these standards. Their communication is based
on multicasts, what also disqualifies the usage of TLS without
adaption. Managing multicast VPN connections on a central-
ized server is complicated and therefore as well inappropriate
for securing building automation systems. For this reason, a
security layer addressing the specific requirements of these
protocol standards is introduced, strongly influenced by the
implementation of TLS[22].
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The increasing level of vertical integration from automation
systems into a company’s IT infrastructure, specifically by
the adoption of Ethernet, has opened them to several attacks
with possible effects that cannot be underestimated. Security
objectives for solutions to protect such systems that do not
violate their existing requirements needed to be elaborated
first. Specially prospects on the availability, real-time capa-
bility and the usually long-term operation of industrial control
systems has represented a particular challenge. A widespread
representative of such real-time Ethernet based field bus pro-
tocols is PROFINET, which we used to apply our case study
on. To date, no specific security solutions besides physical
network separation exist for PROFINET, which means we
needed to define which security measures we want to achieve.
While device authentication and data integrity are mandatory
to provide a minimal level of security, confidentiality was
rated as optional feature probably needed where trade secrets
could be disclosed. Since PROFINET is a standard adopted
by multiple device vendors, security mechanisms shall be easy
6Open Platform Communication Unified Architecture: A machine to ma-
chine (M2M) industrial communication protocol developed by the OPCFoun-
cation.
7Building Automation Control Network: A network protocol for building
automation systems developed by the American Society of Heating, Refrig-
erating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE).
8Konnex Bus: A standardised communication protocol managed by the
KNX association, based on three predecessors European Home Systems
Protocol (EHS), BatiBUS, and the European Installation Bus (EIB).
and seamless to integrate into existing devices. We therefore
elaborated the optimal placement of security mechanisms
within the OSI reference model. The resulting statement is,
that a placement in the network or transport layer (3 or 4) is
most suitable to meet the requirements. We also worked out
that it is advisable to consolidate standard IT security solutions
for the usage in PROFINET (as well as general industrial
control protocols), even if they cannot be applied without
adaption. This recommendation is based on the findings, that
even if a custom solution would be developed from scratch,
this process will be guided by existing solutions and end up
in a similar setup, but never inherently equally secure. Given
that, we analyzed the suitability of different existing security
standards - namely IEEE 802.1X Network Access Control,
IPSec and (D)TLS - according their adoption for PROFINET.
(D)TLS turned out as the most promising candidate, therefore
a deeper look on the specific adaptions which fulfil all the
mentioned requirements followed. Mainly, adjustments on the
record protocol header to reduce the performance overhead
as well as a channel multiplexing functionality to ensure
transparent key renewal are necessary changes. Regardless,
we are convinced that these effort will pay off, since we can
benefit from a well-established, matured solution.
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